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1. Introduction 
 
In Michael v Constable of South Wales the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
(‘UKSC’) upheld the striking out of a negligence action brought by the estate of a 
murdered victim of domestic violence.1 Ms. Michael’s ex-partner, Williams, 
discovered her in bed with another man.  Williams hit her, left to take the other man 
into town, and told her he would return to kill her. Michael made an emergency 
telephone call to the police. Her call was misrouted to the neighbouring county and 
answered by a police operator, Ms. Mason. Michael described the attack and told 
Mason that Williams was going to kill her. Mason told Michael she would notify the 
police force in Michael’s area. She logged the call as “Grade 1,” which meant a 
response within 5 minutes was required. However, when Mason contacted Gould, 
the police operator in Michael’s area, she neglected to mention that Michael was in 
fear for her life. Gould therefore logged the call as “Grade 2,” which meant a 
response within an hour. Michael called a second time about 15 minutes after her 
first call. There were screams on the line and then the call ended.  The event was 
then upgraded to “Grade 1.” The police arrived at Michael’s home 22 minutes after 
her first call and discovered that Williams had brutally stabbed Michael to death. 
Had the police not bungled her first call, it seems likely that the claimants could have 
established that the police would have been able to save Michael’s life. Williams 
pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Mason and Gould 
faced disciplinary action. The Independent Police Complaints Commission issued a 
report strongly criticizing Mason for breaching internal policy by failing to obtain 
critical information from Michael. The police force in Michael’s area was criticized 
for failing to respond immediately upon receiving the report from Mason, given that 
so much critical information was missing.2 Nevertheless, in a 5-2 decision the UKSC 
dismissed an action in negligence, brought on behalf of Michael’s parents and 
children, seeking damages against the Chief Constables of both counties.  
 
The majority in Michael displayed little interest in Ms. Michael’s 
experience. Instead, it focussed on affirming a fundamental principle of UK law: that 
                                                 
* Professor, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law. 
 
1  Michael v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police, [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 [Michael].  
 
2  United Kingdom, Independent Police Complaints Commission, Independent Investigation into Police 
Contact with Joanna Michael prior to her death, online: 
<https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/investigation_commissioner_reports/joanna_mich
ael_final_report.pdf> at 3–4. 
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a common law duty of care in negligence can never be founded on a statutory duty or 
power alone. Michael holds that the courts should not recognize unique public duties 
of care. A unique public duty is one that is imposed on governments or other public 
defendants where no such duty would be imposed on a private party in the same or 
an analogous situation.3 Instead, the liability of public defendants must be based on 
the application of ordinary private law principles. McBride calls this the Diceyan 
principle.4 Public actors should be “under the same (emphasis added) law that 
applies to private citizens,” a principle Dicey called the “idea of equality.”5 
 
Like the Michael decision, this article does not deal primarily with the 
social problem of domestic violence. It does shed some light on the question of 
police responsibilities to potential victims of crime who reach them on emergency 
hotlines. However, the primary focus is on unique duties of care, with Michael 
serving as a provocative background against which to evaluate the arguments. I 
believe that Ms. Michael’s family was entitled to a remedy in tort. I do not believe it 
would be necessary in Canada to create a unique public duty to provide one. 
 
Public defendants owe the same duties of care as do private citizens.6 In 
Section 2, I will review the basic law of negligence pertaining to the failure of one 
private party to confer a benefit on another.7 The general rule is that one private party 
                                                 
3  Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 SCR 129 [Hill] is 
an example of a duty of care that may only be owed by the police, but is nevertheless analogous to private 
party duties. The court recognized a duty of care owed by an investigating police officer to a suspect in a 
criminal investigation. The relationship between the parties is analogous to other special relationships of 
control and vulnerability between private parties where exceptional affirmative duties of care have been 
recognized. See 175–177, below. 
 
4 Nicholas McBride, “Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2” (2015) 
University of Cambridge Legal Paper Research Series, Paper No. 21/2015 at 5, online: 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2565068> [McBride, “Michael Comment”]. See also Nicholas McBride, “Michael 
and the future of tort law” (2016) 32 J of Professional Negligence 14 at 15, n 12 (WL) where the author 
has now renamed it the “uniform approach” [McBride, “Professional Negligence”]. 
 
5 Peter Hogg, Patrick Monahan & Wade Wright, Liability of The Crown, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) 
at 218–19 citing Albert Venn Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed (London: McMillan, 1959) at 
193.    
 
6 However, the Canadian public defendant may enjoy an immunity from liability if the allegation of 
negligence concerns core government policy. See Just v British Columbia, [1989] 2 SCR 1228, 64 DLR 
(4th) 689 [Just] and R v Imperial Tobacco Canada, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 SCR 45 [Imperial Tobacco]. 
Immunity is different than an objection to a unique public duty. See 172, below.   It can be argued that 
immunizing public defendants from ordinary negligence liability is as objectionable as subjecting them to 
unique duties. See Bruce Feldthusen, “Public Authority Immunity from Negligence Liability: Uncertain, 
Unnecessary, and Unjustified” (2014) 92 Can Bar Rev 211. 
 
7 The defendant does not perform an act that causes harm. Rather the defendant fails to prevent harm or 
fails to provide other benefits. This is described variously; e.g. as potential liability for nonfeasance, for 
omissions, or for a failure to take positive action. See Childs v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18 at paras 31–32, 
[2006] 1 SCR 643 [Childs]. Examples include duties to rescue, duties to warn, duties to protect, and duties 
to control. See also 195, below.  
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does not owe an affirmative duty to confer a benefit upon another.8 There are 
numerous exceptions to this “no duty” rule. Canadian courts probably recognize a 
broader range of exceptions, and apply them less strictly than do courts in the UK.   
 
Section 3 suggests that Michael would have been decided differently in 
Canada,9 and possibly should have been decided differently in the UK, based on 
basic private party negligence law. The Michael claim ought to have been allowed to 
proceed to trial. There is a sound case that the claimants could have established that 
the police assumed responsibility to Ms. Michael. If necessary, they might also have 
been able to establish that she relied on the police to her detriment. This is an 
important conclusion because it demonstrates that basic negligence law is not as 
impotent in the face of domestic abuse as Michael suggests it is in the UK. It also 
shows that basic negligence law can take into account unique aspects of government 
conduct without creating unique public duties of care.10 
 
Sections 4 and 5 consider the alternative argument: assuming that the facts 
will not support a duty in private party negligence law, when, if ever, ought the law 
to recognize unique public duties.11 Section 4 considers arguments in favour of 
unique duties that are grounded in what McBride calls the “policy approach” derived 
from the Anns case.12 Characteristic of this approach is a presumption that 
government owes a duty to provide benefits to its citizens at a standard of reasonable 
care unless there are good reasons to deny or limit the duty.13 McBride notes that the 
                                                 
8 The classic authority is Osterlind v Hill, 263 Mass 73 (1928), 160 NE 301. The defendant rented a canoe 
to an intoxicated customer. He then ignored the customer’s cries for help when the canoe tipped. The court 
held that he did not owe a duty to rescue the plaintiff. This case would probably be decided differently 
today in Canada, based on a special relationship exception. See Childs, ibid at paras 38–40.   
 
9 A Canadian case somewhat similar to Michael is Mooney v British Columbia (AG), 2001 BCSC 419, 
[2001] BCLWD 913, aff’d 2004 BCCA 402, 31 BCLR (4th) 61, leave to appeal to SCC refused, Mooney 
v Canada (AG) (3 March 2005), No 30546 [Mooney]. Mooney formally reported to the police credible 
threats of violence by her ex-partner. The police did nothing. Forty-seven days later he broke into her 
house, killing her friend and injuring her daughter. At trial a duty of care was recognized on the part of 
police to protect Mooney. On appeal the case was dismissed on the issue of causation. The question of 
unique duties of care was not discussed explicitly. See Margaret I Hall, “Duty, Causation, and Third-Party 
Perpetrators: The Bonnie Mooney Case” (2005) 50 McGill LJ 597; Elizabeth Sheehy,  Defending Battered 
Women on Trial: Lessons from the Transcripts  (Vancouver: UBC press, 2013) at ch. 2; Elizabeth Sheehy, 
“Causation, Common Sense and the Common Law: Replacing Unexamined Assumptions with What We 
Know About Male Violence Against Women or From Jane Doe to Bonnie Mooney” (2005) 17 CJWL 97; 
Erika Chamberlain, “Tort Claims for Failure to Protect: Reasons for (Cautious) Optimism since Mooney ” 
(2012) 75 Sask L Rev 245 [Chamberlain, “Optimism”]; and Julia Tolmie, “Police Negligence in Domestic 
Violence Cases and the Canadian Case of Mooney: What Should Have Happened, and Could It Happen in 
New Zealand?” 2006 NZLR 243.   
 
10 See 178–181 and 196–200 below. 
 
11 See text accompanying note 3.  
 
12 McBride, “Michael Comment”, supra note 4 at 6 discussing Anns v Merton London Borough Council, 
[1978] AC 728, [1977] UKHL 4 [Anns].  
 
13 See 189–195, below, where this “Good Public Samaritan” approach is criticized.  
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policy approach often has resulted in the same outcome – no unique public duty – as 
the Diceyan approach.14 The sympathetic facts in Michael are useful to illustrate the 
issues. Section 5 considers the possibility of unique public duties of care in narrowly 
defined specific circumstances. 
 
Although Anns has been overruled in the UK,15 Canada continues to follow 
robustly the Anns policy approach to duty of care.16 Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
Supreme Court of Canada (‘the Supreme Court’) has recognized at least 5 unique 
public duties of care.17 The Supreme Court also purports to follow the same rule as 
the UKSC, that a common law duty of care cannot be imposed on public authorities 
based on the words of the enabling statutes alone.18 Yet it is difficult to explain the 
recognized unique public duties otherwise. Rarely has the court acknowledged that is 
creating a unique public duty of care and never has it discussed explicitly and fully 
whether it is appropriate to do so, as did the court in Michael. There may exist a 
principled justification for imposing unique public duties, but it has never been put 
forth as such.  Instead, I will suggest that the unique duties that Canada does 
recognize have emerged on an ad hoc basis, in the process damaging the critical 
structure of common law adjudication.   
 
Issues surrounding unique public duties are sometimes confused with issues 
surrounding government immunity for high level policy decisions.19 This is probably 
because both are concerned with respecting the separation of powers between the 
legislative bodies and the courts.   However, there is a fundamental difference. A 
case for immunity only arises when the public defendant would otherwise be liable 
for breaching a recognized duty of care.20 Immunity is a concept employed to reduce 
government responsibility for otherwise negligent conduct below the level of 
                                                 
14 McBride, “Michael Comment”, supra note 4 at 6.   
 
15 The two-step duty framework was rejected in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 605, 
[1990] 1 All ER 568.  Liability for defective structures was rejected in Murphy v Brentwood District 
Council, [1991] 1 AC 398, [1991] UKHL 2. 
 
16 This is true especially after the decision in Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537 [Cooper]. 
 
17 The following unique duties have been identified by Bruce Feldthusen, “Unique Public Duties of Care: 
Judicial Activism in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2016) 53 Alberta L Rev 955: Schacht v O’Rourke, 
[1976] 1 SCR 53, 55 DLR (3d) 96 [Schacht]; Kamloops (City) v Nielsen, [1984] 2 SCR 2, 10 DLR (4th) 
641 [Kamloops]; Just, supra note 6; Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 SCR 263 (the 
negligence holding against the Chief of Police) [Odhavji]; and Fullowka v Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd, 
2010 SCC 5, [2010] 1 SCR 132 [Fullowka].   
 
18 R v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool , [1983] 1 SCR 205, 143 DLR (3d) 9 [Saskatchewan Wheat Pool]; 
Odhavji Estate, ibid. Admittedly, these decisions are difficult to reconcile with others. See e.g. Cooper, 
supra note 16 at para 43. 
 
19 See also McBride, “Professional Negligence”, supra note 4 at 17 and 20. 
 
20 The decision in Imperial Tobacco, supra note 6 provides an excellent example. The defendant Canada 
was held to owe a recognized prima facie duty regarding misrepresentations that caused detrimental 
reliance loss at Step 1 of the Anns framework. However, at Step 2 Canada was granted immunity for its 
alleged breach of duty because the court held that the representation was made as an exercise of high level 
policy. 
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responsibility owed to others by private citizens. In contrast, unique public duties 
arise by definition only when the conduct at issue is not governed by ordinary private 
party negligence law. Whereas a claim of immunity seeks special exculpatory 
treatment, a unique public duty is an additional duty owed only by the public 
defendant. The objection to a unique public duty is that it violates Dicey’s equality 
principle.21 There is no other duty from which immunity could be sought.22   
 
Although “duty of care” is a classic common law negligence question, 
unique public duties of care raise important questions about the separation of powers 
in constitutional law. When courts create unique public duties of care, I will argue 
that they appropriate unilaterally powers that previously and properly belonged to the 
legislative branch.23 I will argue that the law of negligence ought not to recognize 
unique public duties of care unless a principled justification that does not prove to be 
over-broad can be identified. No doubt there are compelling counter-arguments.24 
Canadian law would benefit if these came forth explicitly.    
 
 
2.  The Duty to Confer Benefits in Private Party Negligence Law 
 
To evaluate the case for unique public duties of care it is necessary to identify the 
principles that govern duties to provide benefits between private parties.25 The 
general rule in negligence is that one private party does not owe an affirmative duty 
to confer benefits upon another. I will refer to this as the “no duty” rule. There are 
                                                 
21 Logically, the objection to unique public duties should be extended to policy immunity. They both entail 
treating governments differently from private parties.  
 
22 Prior to Imperial Tobacco, supra note 6, Just was the leading authority on policy immunity. Just created 
a unique public duty of care. Cory J was possibly careless in using immunity language to refer to the 
process of creating a unique duty. I think not. Several passages in Just suggest that Cory J did not support 
unique public duties and did not realize that he was creating one. See Just, supra note 6 at 1239 and 1244. 
The finding of proximity in Just is out of line with basic private party negligence law and with proximity 
decisions in most other public authority cases. See Taylor v Canada (AG), 2012 ONCA 479 at para 80, 
111 OR (3d) 161. The erroneous assumption that he was dealing with a pre-existing common law duty 
principle is what best explains Cory J’s discussion about immunity.   
 
23 This is a different and narrower argument than a rights-based argument that would preclude any and all 
judicial policy making. See 192, below. 
 
24 I would find it more difficult to adhere to this position if I were not confident that basic Canadian 
negligence law would support a duty of care on the part of the police in a case such as Michael.   
 
25 I rely on the excellent article by Peter Benson to explain the significance of this distinction in private 
law. At the risk of over-simplification, he says “. . . misfeasance restricts the fundamental imperative in 
private law to a prohibition against conduct, whether act or omission, that injures or interferes with a 
definite but limited kind of protected interest; namely, another’s ownership right” (person or property).  
Nonfeasance does not interfere with the plaintiff’s right to exclude others from her personal or proprietary 
interests; it fails to benefit her. See Peter Benson, “Misfeasance as an Organizing Normative Idea in 
Private Law” (2010) 60 UTLJ 731 at 733 and generally at 731–737. See also Childs, supra note 7 at paras 
31–32; and Donal Nolan, “The Liability of Public Authorities for Failing to Confer Benefits (2011) 127 
LQR 260.  
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numerous exceptions. Some are unclear or contentious.  Many overlap. Authors and 
courts classify the exceptions differently.  
 
 
A.  Defendant by his Fault Creates a Situation of Peril 
 
When a defendant by his fault creates a situation of peril, the defendant comes under 
a duty to protect the person so-imperilled.26 Strictly speaking, this is not an exception 
to the “no duty” rule. The “no duty” rule does not apply to misfeasance that causes 
physical harm. However, the creation of the new peril frequently occurs in the course 
of providing a benefit to another. In Hampshire, for example, a fire department was 
held liable based on its decision during its intervention to turn off the sprinkler 
system. Turning off the sprinklers made the fire damage more extensive than it 
would have been had they done nothing. The department was held liable for the 
additional damage. 27 In Zelenko v Gimbel Brothers the defendant removed the ill 
plaintiff to a place where no one else could help him. The fresh harm was the 
defendant’s denying the plaintiff other aid.28 There is no reason to distinguish 
making someone worse off by denying other aid from any other manner of inflicting 
harm.   
 
 
B.  Duty to Warn 
 
There is no general duty to warn another about dangers of which one is aware.29 
However, product manufacturers and distributors owe a duty to warn of inherently 
dangerous products or dangerous uses of safe products. The duty arises when the 
defendant acquires actual knowledge of the danger, including those it discovers after 
sale.30 Significantly, it arises even when the defect was not caused by any fault on 
the part of the defendant. This exception only applies to a defendant who has created 
the peril. It is also relevant that the product manufacturer exception is limited to 
                                                 
26 Videan v British Transport Commission, [1963] 2 QB 650 at 699, [1963] 2 All ER 860, quoted with 
approval in Horsley v McLaren, [1972] SCR 441 at 444, 22 DLR (3d) 545 [Horsley]. Dorset Yacht Co Ltd 
v Home Office, [1970] AC 1004, [1972] All ER 294 [Dorset Yacht] discussed below, may also be 
explained this way. Horsley also establishes that if the defendant’s breach of the original duty foreseeably 
induces a new rescue attempt, a further duty may be owed to protect the new rescuer. The defendant’s 
breach of the original duty constitutes a fresh peril to the foreseeable rescuer. 
 
27 Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council, [1997] QB 1004, [1997] 2 All ER 865 (CA), 
discussed in Michael, supra note 1 at para 71.  
 
28 Zelenko v Gimbel Brothers, 287 NYS 134 at 135, aff’d 287 NYS 136 (1936). 
 
29 See Margaret I Hall, “Duty to Protect, Duty to Control and the Duty to Warn” (2003) 82 Can Bar Rev 
645 at 673–79. 
 
30 Rivtow Marine v Washington Iron Works, [1974] SCR 1189, 40 DLR (3d) 530; Lambert v Lastoplex 
Chemicals, [1972] SCR 569, 25 DLR (3d) 121; Hollis v Dow Corning, [1995] 4 SCR 634, 266 DLR (4th) 
257.  
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commercial defendants who create the risk.31 It is doubtful, but possible, that a duty 
to warn might be extended to non-commercial defendants such as motorists who 
create a peril by being involved in an automobile accident without any fault on their 
part.32  
 
 
C.  Special Relationships of Control:33 
 
There exists a number of status-based “special relationships” where the more 
powerful party owes affirmative duties to the more vulnerable party. The term 
“special relationship” is not a technical term so much as a convenient label for an 
open-ended list of such relationships. Some are formal, ongoing status relationships 
like “parent-child” or “doctor-patient.”  Others, like “commercial alcohol provider-
customer,” are situational.34 The underlying principle is that a defendant in a position 
of control over a vulnerable plaintiff owes certain affirmative obligations to the 
plaintiff. These are true exceptions to the “no duty” rule.   
 
Vulnerability alone cannot justify an exception to the “no duty” rule. If it 
did there would nothing left of the rule.35 Having control simply makes an 
intervention easier or more likely to be effective. This is irrelevant to the “no duty” 
rule. Control and vulnerability must work together. Perhaps the answer lies in the 
plaintiff’s exclusive right to control over her own body or property. When a 
defendant assumes or obtains, and retains, some of what was originally the plaintiff’s 
exclusive right of control, the defendant is no longer a mere bystander. The 
relationship has become “special” because of the transfer of control. At that point, 
the defendant has been entrusted with some of the core rights of the plaintiff. It has 
also been argued that a government police force effectively monopolizes and 
controls a citizen’s right to protect herself from crime and that this entails special 
affirmative obligations.36     
                                                 
31 See Childs, supra note 7 at para 35.  
 
32 See Ziemer v Wheeler, 2014 BCSC 2049, [2015] BCWLD 232. See also Oke v Weide Transport (1963), 
41 DLR (2d) 53, 43 WWR 2 (Man CA) per Freedman JA dissenting.    
 
33 See Hall, supra note 29; Nicholas McBride & Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law, 5th ed (Harlow England: 
Pearson Education, 2015) at 245–253.  
 
34 See Hall, supra note 29 at 653. 
 
35 See Allan Beever, “The Basis of the Hedley Byrne Action” in Kitt Barker, Ross Grantham & Warren 
Swain, The Law of Misstatements (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2015) 83 at 97.  Beever 
suggests that had the passenger who fell overboard in Horsley swum nearby to another boat the 
vulnerability and dependency would be the same as it was when he stayed near his own boat.  But those 
on the other boat would not owe any special duty to rescue him.  See contra Andrew Robertson & Julia 
Wang, “The Assumption of Responsibility” in Barker, Grantham & Swain 49 at 70 who say dependency 
is the key.   
 
36 This is an important idea offered in support of a unique public duty of care by Stelios Tofaris & Sandy 
Steel, Police Liability in Negligence for Failure to Prevent Crime: Time to Rethink (University of 
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There are numerous examples of recognized special relationships of control: 
“employer-employee”37; “pleasure boat captain – passenger”38; “occupier of land-
entrants”39; and “landlord-tenant.”40 Some of these special relationships involve 
public defendants including “police officer-suspect”41; “police officer-informant”42; 
“police force-potential victims of crime”43 and “warden-prisoner.”44  
 
Doctors and other health care providers owe a unique obligation to perform 
the professional service with the reasonable care expected of similarly situated 
professionals.45 A doctor who voluntarily intervenes to treat an accident victim must 
exercise reasonable care to improve the patient’s condition, not merely to avoid 
making it worse.46 There are several possible explanations for this rule, none 
universally accepted as dominant. It is certainly relevant that medical intervention 
puts the patient’s health, possibly life, at risk.47 This special obligation may also be 
explained as a requirement derived from the professional status. This may be part of 
our understanding of what it means to render “professional” services. Even by 
contract, medical doctors are not permitted to provide bargain-basement, lower skill 
professional services. They must meet the standard of the profession. Or, this 
affirmative obligation may derive from one of two possible meanings of “assumption 
of responsibility” in basic private party negligence. The first refers to a duty not to 
induce detrimental reliance loss. However, the second, an “equivalent to contract” 
approach to assumption of responsibility, requires the defendant to provide a positive 
                                                                                                                   
Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No 39/2014) at 5 [Tofaris & Steel, “Police 
Liability”], online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2469532>, and quoted in dissent by Lady Hale in Michael, 
supra note 1 at para 189;  and Stelios Tofaris & Sandy Steel, “Negligence Liability for Omissions and the 
Police” (2016) 75 Cambridge LJ 128. [Tofaris & Steel, “Omissions”].  It is expressed in their fourth 
condition for proximity, quoted at 198, below. 
 
37 Hunt v Sutton Group Incentive Reality, 60 OR (3d) 665, 215 DLR (4th) 193; Jordan House v Menow, 
[1974] SCR 239, 38 DLR (3d) 105 per Laskin J [Jordan House].  
 
38 Horsley, supra note 26. 
 
39 Depue v Flateau, 111 NW 1 (Minn SC 1907) discussed in Beever, supra note 35 at 96.  
 
40 Q v Minto Management (1985), 49 OR (2d) 531, 15 DLR 4th 581 (SC). 
 
41 Hill, supra note 3. 
 
42 Robertson & Wang, supra note 35 at 78–9. 
 
43 Jane Doe v Toronto (Metropolitan) Commissioners of Police, 39 OR (3d) 487, 72 DLR (4th) 580 (Ct J 
(Gen Div)). 
 
44 Dorset Yacht, supra note 26. 
 
45 The same may be true of other professionals such as lawyers who voluntarily provide professional 
services. Michael, supra note 1 at para 178 quoting Lanphier v Phipos (1838), 8 C & P 475, 479; Robert 
Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 12. 
 
46 Nolan, supra note 25 at 282. 
 
47See Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46 at s 217.  
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benefit if that was the responsibility assumed. These two possibilities are discussed 
below.48   
 
There are also numerous examples of “special relationships of control” that 
entail the dual duties to control the vulnerable party and to protect third parties from 
being injured by the vulnerable party.49 Liability to the third party will depend on the 
nature of both relationships, defendant-perpetrator and defendant-third party 
plaintiff.50 Doctors may be required to protect others from their patients.51 Parents 
are required to protect their child and also required to control the child so that the 
child does not harm others. Commercial alcohol providers owe a duty to protect their 
patrons,52 and also a duty to control their patrons so they do not injure others.53 
Jailers owe a duty to protect their prisoners, and also a duty to control them so they 
do not escape and injure others.54 These duties to the third party are not pure 
exceptions to the no duty rule. They are all but specific examples of the broader 
principle discussed above that a defendant who creates a situation of peril by his 
fault owes a duty to protect persons so imperilled.   
 
 
D.  Assumption of Responsibility 
 
Recall, the general rule is that one party is under no duty to confer a benefit on 
another. In Michael, the majority considered two recognized exceptions to the “no 
duty” rule, eventually holding that neither applied to the facts. The first was when 
one party owed a duty to control another, and thereby came under a duty to protect a 
third party.55 The second was when the defendant assumed responsibility to benefit 
the plaintiff under the Hedley Byrne principle.56 
 
                                                 
48 See 178, below. 
 
49 See generally Hall, supra note 29. This is one of two exceptions to the “no duty” rule identified in 
Michael, supra note 1 at para 99.    
 
50 Hall, ibid at 646; Michael, supra note 1 at para 99. 
 
51 See Wenden v Trikha, 1 Alta LR (3d) 283, 124 AR 1 aff’d 135 AR 382, 14 CCLT (2d) 225 (CA), 
leave to appeal to the SCC refused 149 AR 160, 17 CCLT (2d) 285. See also Douglas Smith, “Wenden 
v Trikha and Third Party Liability of Doctors and Hospitals: What's Been Happening to Tarasoff” 
(1995-96), 4 Health L Rev 12. 
 
52 Jordan House, supra note 37 at 248. 
 
53 Stewart v Pettie, [1995] 1 SCR 131 at 143, 25 Alta LR (3d) 297. 
 
54  Dorest Yacht, supra note 26 was so explained in Michael, supra note 1 at paras 58, 89, 142.   
 
55 Michael, supra note 1 at para 135. 
 
56 Ibid at para 136.   
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The court in Michael stated the Hedley Byrne principle in two significantly 
different ways. First, commenting on what (little) Lord Goff had said about it in 
Spring, the court said:57 
 
The underlying principle rested on an assumption of responsibility by the 
defendant towards the plaintiff, coupled with reliance by the plaintiff on 
the exercise by the defendant of due skill and care. The principle that a 
duty of care could arise in that way was not limited to a case concerned 
with the giving of information and advice (Hedley Byrne) but could 
include the performance of other services. 
 
Under this view, the defendant assumes responsibility to exercise due skill and care, 
the familiar standard of care in negligence law, but not unknown in contract.58 What 
precisely “assumes responsibility” means is contentious in UK law.59 Michael seems 
to adopt the view that responsibility is actively assumed by the defendant rather than 
imposed by law.60 Detrimental reliance is presumably required.61 This explanation of 
Hedley Byrne is a variant, albeit a significant variation,62 of the “create the peril” 
situation.63 This is also a principle that antedates Hedley Byrne, applies to acts as 
well as to statements, and applies to physical harm as well as to economic loss.64  
 
Later, Lord Toulson explained the Hedley Byrne principle differently:65 
 
The principle established by Hedley Byrne is that a careless 
misrepresentation may give rise to a relationship akin to contract under 
which there is a positive duty to act. Lord Devlin spoke of "an assumption 
of responsibility in circumstances in which, but for the absence of 
consideration, there would be a contract" and he said that "wherever there 
is a relationship equivalent to contract, there is a duty of care" (pp 529-
530).   
 
                                                 
57 Ibid at para 67. 
 
58 See e.g. Esso Petroleum v Mardon, [1976] QB 801, [1976] 2 All ER 5 (CA) per L Denning. 
 
59 See generally Beever, supra note 35; Robertson & Wang, supra note 35; and Christian Witting, “What 
Are We Doing Here? The Relationship Between Negligence in General and Misstatements in English 
Law” in Barker, Grantham, & Swain, supra note 35.   
 
60 Michael, supra note 1 at para 67 
 
61 Ibid at para 138. 
 
62 The plaintiff injures herself by relying on the defendant. There must be an adequate explanation of why 
she should be able to hold the defendant responsible for this. See Stephen R Perry, “Protected Interests 
and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence” (1992) 42 UTLJ 247 at 285. 
 
63 See Nolan, supra note 25 at 278. 
 
64 Mercer v SE&C Ry, [1922] 2 KB 549.   
 
65 Michael, supra note 1 at para 135. 
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The “equivalent to contract” approach has several possible implications. Presumably 
it would require privity, thereby limiting the ambit of responsibility. The basis of 
liability would not be the failure to confer the benefit, but the breach of the 
undertaking.66 The defendant could assume responsibility to provide the plaintiff 
with a positive benefit, not merely for taking due care to prevent a detrimental 
reliance loss.67 The court would be looking for an intention to be bound to a promise 
confer a benefit, not merely an intention that the plaintiff rely. The issue would go 
beyond whether responsibility was assumed to what responsibility was assumed.   
 
The equivalent to contract approach enjoys powerful academic support.68 
The cases said to support it are not definitive.69 Later, Lord Toulson seems to reject 
the broader approach without discussing it, and to require detrimental reliance. 
Despite the absence of clear authority, the case for a duty to provide positive benefits 
independent of detrimental reliance is a compelling one that is likely to be pursued in 
future. The court in Michael missed an excellent opportunity to consider it.  
 
 
3.  Michael falls within the Assumption of Responsibility Exception to the “No 
Duty” Rule 
 
Although there was great vulnerability to the police on the part of Ms. Michael, the 
police did not exercise any control over her such as would have entailed a duty to 
protect her. They did not create the original danger that Williams posed to Michael. 
Nor were they in a traditional special relationship of control with the murderer 
Williams based on custody. Later, I will suggest that an expanded duty to control 
might apply had the police been aware of the risk to Michael, but she had been 
unaware of it. In the actual Michael situation, the most promising avenue for 
establishing a duty of care under basic negligence law was to establish an assumption 
of responsibility on the part of one or both of the police emergency operators. The 
claimants must have been devastated to discover that the majority only found it 
necessary to devote a single paragraph to this crucial line of argument, and to dismiss 
it summarily. The key paragraph reads as follows:70 
 
Mr Bowen submitted that what was said by the Gwent call handler who 
received Ms. Michael's 999 call was arguably sufficient to give rise to an 
assumption of responsibility on the Hedley Byrne principle as amplified in 
                                                 
66 See Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 222. 
 
67 See Beever, supra note 35 at 98–99. 
  
68 See ibid at 83, 104–105; Stevens, supra note 45 at 14; Nolan, supra note 25 at 282–83.  
 
69 These are primarily the health care professional cases some of which may be explained otherwise. See 
176–177, above. But see especially Barrett v Ministry of Defence, [1995] 3 All ER 87, [1995] 1 WLR 
1217. See also McBride & Bagshaw, supra note 33 at 230.   
 
70 Michael, supra note 1 at para 138. 
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Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc. I agree with the Court of Appeal that 
the argument is not tenable. The only assurance which the call handler 
gave to Ms. Michael was that she would pass on the call to the South 
Wales Police. She gave no promise how quickly they would respond. She 
told Ms. Michael that they would want to call her back and asked her to 
keep her phone free, but this did not amount to advising or instructing her 
to remain in her house, as was suggested. Ms. Michael's call was made on 
her mobile phone. Nor did the call handler's inquiry whether Ms. Michael 
could lock the house amount to advising or instructing her to remain there. 
The case is very different from Kent v Griffiths where the call handler gave 
misleading assurances that an ambulance would be arriving shortly. 
 
This is virtually all the court had to say about the application of private party 
negligence law to what actually happened to Ms. Michael. The court’s lengthy and 
detailed discussion of the (arguably) grander principles of unique public duties, and 
the rights versus policy debate, overwhelmed discussion of the outrageous 
circumstances of the murder.71  But there is nothing inconsistent with supporting the 
Diceyan approach or the rights-based approach on the one hand, and giving proper 
consideration to the question of what responsibilities in ordinary private party 
negligence, if any, a police emergency operator assumes to a citizen who calls in 
distress on the other.  The conclusion may well be “none.” However, this paragraph 
offers scant and superficial justification for that conclusion.   
 
The Supreme Court of Canada no longer follows Hedley Byrne in negligent 
misrepresentation cases. Today, a plaintiff need only establish that the defendant 
ought to have reasonably foreseen that the plaintiff would rely on the information or 
advice to their detriment, and that reliance in the particular case was reasonable. The 
Supreme Court restricted the scope of the duty by adopting a transaction-specific 
“end and aim” test to control indeterminate liability.72 Possibly, the reliance 
approach in Hercules has replaced the assumption of responsibility approach across 
the board.73 Either way, the claimants in Michael have a strong case. It is obvious 
                                                 
71 Lord Toulson’s reasons constitute a dream come true for supporters of the Diceyan approach, and 
supporters of the rights-based approach to negligence law. One hundred and thirty-nine paragraphs of 
obiter dicta would have been less compelling. Even McBride’s usually sharp style of criticism appears 
somewhat muted by his undisguised joy at the triumph of the Diceyan and rights-based approaches. In 
“Michael Comment”, supra note 4 at 9–10 he says with uncharacteristic understatement:   
But the UKSC was taking a bit of a chance by making these findings without the 
benefit of a full hearing. Perhaps the need to lay down a strong line in Michael on 
the future of liabilities of public bodies in omissions cases justified doing this, but I 
do feel some unease at this aspect of the decision, particularly as there was evidence 
that Joanna’s neighbours could hear what was going on, and were concerned enough 
that they called the police themselves (though their calls were mis-routed to the 
Gwent police as well). 
 
72 Hercules Managements v Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 SCR 165 at 200, 146 DLR (4th) 577. This is 
developed by Bruce Feldthusen, “Hedley Byrne: Misused, then Exiled by the Supreme Court of Canada” 
in Barker, Grantham & Swain, supra note 35, ch 11. 
 
73 That said, there is ample support for the assumption of responsibility principle that has never been 
overruled or even criticized.  See e.g. Welbridge Holdings Ltd v Greater Winnipeg, [1971] SCR 957, 22 
DLR (3d) 470; J Nunes Diamonds Ltd v Dominion Electric Protection Co, [1972] SCR 769, 26 DLR (3d) 
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that someone in the position of Ms. Mason, the first call operator, knows that 
emergency callers are relying on her. The claim is transaction-specific. The very 
nature of the service is to intend, induce and invite specific reliance. Citizens call the 
emergency line expecting a proper response to the emergency. Relying on the police 
to provide one is entirely reasonable. 
 
The claim in Michael was struck out on a different basis. The majority held 
that Ms. Mason made no relevant statements or promises whatsoever. The majority 
conceded that if Mason told Michael that help would arrive shortly, there might have 
been a duty, and liability if reliance on that statement had caused additional harm.74 
True, Mason only gave assurance that she would pass on the call to the proper police 
department. But it is doubtful the claim would have been dismissed had Mason 
simply called Gould, told him there was a call for him and passed on Michael’s 
number. Surely Ms. Michael was entitled to believe at a minimum that Mason 
undertook to convey the full and relevant details of her call according to established 
police procedure. This Mason failed to do. 
 
When Mason asked Michael whether she was able to lock the house, it 
would have been reasonable for Michael, beaten, terrified, alone, and as vulnerable 
to Mason as she can possibly be, to assume that she was being advised to stay in the 
house and lock up. The problem is a line of UK authority that requires in police cases 
that only an unambiguous explicit promise can constitute an assumption of 
responsibility.75 Lord Kerr effectively criticized this rule in dissent.76 Employing it in 
Michael is the ultimate irony. The entire majority judgment is devoted to 
championing the Diceyan approach. Yet, when it came to the actual claim the 
majority retained a rule that protects the police from the ordinary rules of negligence 
with a unique and strictly limited public duty. 
 
Many, if not most, of the significant facts referred to immediately above are 
uniquely associated with the police response to an emergency call. However, the 
duty that I argue should result is not a unique public duty. The principle that liability 
will be imposed based on an assumption of responsibility is a principle of basic 
negligence law. The very nature of the public emergency service is to intend, induce 
and invite specific reliance, the touchstones of an assumption of responsibility. In 
this way, the common law may take into account factual matrixes that are unique to 
                                                                                                                   
699 per Spence J (dissenting), citing John Fleming, The Law of Torts, 4th ed (Sydney: Law Book Co, 
1971) at 564; Hodgins v Nepean (Township) Hydro-Electric Commission, [1976] 2 SCR 501, 60 DLR (3d) 
1; Carman Construction Ltd v Canadian Pacific Railway Co, [1982] 1 SCR 958, 136 DLR (3d) 193; 
Central Trust Co v Rafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147, 31 DLR (4th) 481. 
 
74 Michael, supra note 1 at para 138; this was the case in Kent v Griffiths (2000), [2001] QB 36, [2000] 2 
All ER 474 (CA). 
 
75 See Michael, supra note 1 at para 164. This rule is consistent with the “contract without consideration” 
approach to Hedley Byrne discussed immediately below.   
 
76 See supra note 1, especially at paras 165–68. 
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government activity and address the understandable view that there are situations 
where we might expect more from the government than from a private citizen. This 
is how the argument above is constructed.77 The important thing is that the principle 
of law is the same. In contrast, to impose liability on the police in the absence of an 
assumption of responsibility would require a unique principle of public liability.  
 
The next question is whether the claimants are required to prove that the 
failure to communicate the emergency properly, or the advice to stay in the house, or 
any other assumptions of responsibility that might have been revealed at trial, put 
Ms. Michael in a worse position than she would have been in had she not called the 
police. There is strong academic support for a “contract without consideration” 
approach to assumption of responsibility. Under that approach, it is the breach of an 
undertaking, not the infliction of detrimental reliance loss, which constitutes the 
actionable wrong with assumptions of responsibility.78 A party may be held liable for 
failing to deliver a benefit based on an undertaking to do exactly that. Arguably, the 
undertaking to forward the full and relevant details of Michael’s original call to the 
proper police station was an undertaking to provide a benefit. The police promised to 
help her and their failure to do so allowed Williams to murder her. This is an 
argument that ought to have been considered by the court, and the claimants ought to 
have been allowed to develop an evidentiary foundation for it at trial.  
 
Recall also that a doctor’s duty to use reasonable care to improve the 
patient’s situation may be based on the risk to health and life with medical 
interventions.79 If so, an analogy might be drawn to the case of emergency 
responders who begin a professional interaction with a person who is in the midst of 
a life-threatening emergency. This would be consistent with the third requirement for 
an exception to the “no duty” rule favoured by Tofaris and Steel, “A's status creates 
an obligation to protect B from that danger.”80 
 
Finally, assuming the court had considered and rejected these two 
arguments and insisted that detrimental reliance loss was an essential element of the 
claim, it is arguable that there was such detrimental reliance. There were concerned 
neighbours in the near vicinity to whom Michael might have turned had she not 
reasonably understood that she had been advised to stay in the house.81 The 
claimants should have been allowed to develop this argument at trial.    
 
                                                 
77 The same is true of the decision in Hill, supra note 3 at para 27. 
 
78 Detrimental reliance probably must be foreseeable for the duty to arise, but that is different than 
requiring actual detrimental reliance as a condition of duty. See Nolan, supra note 25 at 285–86. 
 
79 Supra note 45.  
 
80 See Tofaris & Steel, “Police Liability”, supra note 36 at 5; and Tofaris & Steel, “Omissions”, supra 
note 36 at 128. See also Michael, supra note 1 at para 197 per Lady Hale, and at paras 178–181 per Lord 
Kerr dissenting. 
 
81 McBride, “Michael Comment”, supra note 4 at 9–10. 
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The reasons for judgment in Michael constitute an impressive review of the 
authorities, an overwhelming endorsement of the Diceyan approach, and a rejection 
of the policy approach to establishing new duties of care. They also constitute an 
inexplicably dismissive application of the law to the facts. What is needed to resolve 
this claim is evidence produced by the parties, tested under oath and woven into 
submissions by trained advocates. The claim ought to have been allowed to proceed 
to trial. It is unlikely that a Canadian court would have stopped this claim on a 
preliminary motion,82 and surprising that the UKSC did so. There is good reason to 
be uneasy about the result.  
 
 
4.  The Difficulties with Unique Public Duties 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
I assume that a Canadian court would have held for the claimants in Michael under 
ordinary negligence law. If not, the question would arise whether the court should 
instead impose a unique public duty. This question may seem odd given how little 
attention the courts have paid to unique public duties in recent times. Subsection B 
below begins by pointing out that although unique public duties do exist in Canadian 
negligence law today, at one time Canadian courts refused to recognize them. Most 
legislative bodies and the courts defined the distinction between the political and the 
judicial realm according to the Diceyan principle that governments should be 
governed by the same rules of negligence law as private parties.    
 
Subsection C considers the general objections to unique duties of care. It 
suggests that the distribution of government largess should be, subject to citizens’ 
rights-based claims, a purely political function. It takes no position on the broader 
question that arises in rights-based negligence discourse about whether courts should 
seek to effect distributive justice between citizens themselves. It identifies the “Good 
Public Samaritan” principle as the apparent justification for the unique public duties 
currently recognized in Canada. This principle states that once a public defendant 
decides to confer a benefit, it then comes under a duty of care to render the benefit 
with reasonable care. It appears that this principle, suspect in its own right, is applied 
on an ad hoc basis. Were it applied to all “like cases,” as it should be with a common 
law commitment to stare decisis, the shift in power from the legislatures to the 
courts, effected by the unconstrained courts themselves, would constitute a dramatic 
change to our constitutional democracy.     
                                                 
82 See Mooney, supra note 9. See also Sunny Dhillon, “Woman sues Surrey RCMP officer for failure to 
act on reported assault,” The Globe & Mail, (14 March 2016), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/woman-sues-rcmp-officer-for-failure-to-act-on-
reported-assault/article29241402/> where the plaintiff’s lawyer proposes to rely on Mooney as a 
precedent.  See also Fullowka, supra note 17 and Heaslip Estate v Ontario, 2009 ONCA 594, 310 DLR 
(4th) 506. 
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Subsection D explores whether much more limited principles might be 
identified to allow for unique public duties in exceptional cases. I remain open to 
such a possibility, but conclude that attempts to justify principled exceptions that are 
not over-broad remain a work in progress.  
 
 
B. Unique Public Duties in Canada: Then and Now  
 
Historically, the rule in Canada was the same as the majority decision in Michael – 
the courts should not recognize unique public duties of care. Today there are at least 
five Supreme Court of Canada precedents for unique public duties,83 including two 
imposed on the police.84 This transition to unique public duties has never been 
openly justified as such by the Supreme Court, let alone considered in depth as it was 
in Michael. Canadian negligence law and Canadian constitutional law would benefit 
from fresh consideration of unique public duties of care. 
 
The point is debatable, but I would suggest that most Canadians do not 
conceive of their constitution as consisting of one set of rules for private citizens and 
another set for public officials. True, it is often appealing to prefer that a loss be 
shifted to a deeper pocket, especially when an avoidable loss is suffered by a 
vulnerable plaintiff. Michael is a sympathetic case. But the temptation to create 
unique public duties must be measured against the fact that a society that normalizes 
unique obligations will also normalize unique public immunities and privileges. A 
special UK rule limiting police liability was invoked to defeat Ms. Michael’s claim.85 
I am even more confident that Canadians do not generally approve of unique excuses 
for government negligence.86 The question must be considered as a broader one than 
that of unique liabilities. We are really talking about conceptualizing government 
and private parties as separate and distinct in private law. This has not been our 
tradition. Our tradition has been that public actors should be “under the same 
                                                 
83 Supra note 17. 
 
84 See Schacht and Odhavji, supra note 17. 
 
85 Michael, supra note 1 at para 164, see also text accompanying note 75.  
 
86 One example is core government policy immunity, supra note 6. Many public authorities are shielded 
by legislation requiring proof of gross negligence or bad faith.  See e.g. Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 
SCC 27, [2010] 2 SCR 28. See also Jacobs v Ottawa (Police Service), 2016 ONCA 345 at para 12, 400 
DLR (4th) 148 where the court affirmed that a police disciplinary offence had to be proven on a special 
and higher standard of proof than the established civil standard of a balance of probabilities. 
Dissappointed plaintiff’s lawyer Lawrence Greenspon was quoted as saying  “we’ve got one law for the 
police, and another law for everyone else” in “Supreme Court dismisses Ottawa police appeal to lower 
standard of proof for officers,” Ottawa Citizen (13 January 2017) online: <ottawacitizen.com/news/local-
news/supreme-court-dismisses-ottawa-police-appeal-to-lower-standard-of-proof-for-officers>. 
Significantly, the legal press called the decision “troubling.”  See “Ruling sets special standard of proof 
for police,” Law Times (30 May 2016).  
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(emphasis added) law that applies to private citizens.”87 This is a fundamental 
political principle.88    
 
Crown Liability legislation by which the Crown surrendered its historical 
immunity from liability in tort evidences Canada’s historical commitment to the 
Diceyan principle. The federal Crown, and the Crown in 8 of the 9 common law 
provinces, consented only to being held vicariously liable for torts committed by 
their servants or agents.89 They did not accept to be held liable for “peculiarly 
governmental activity” where there exists “no clear private analogue.”90 British 
Columbia also consented to “direct” liability, which might be interpreted to include 
unique public duties.91 In Swinamer, the Supreme Court collapsed the distinction 
between direct and vicarious liability without considering explicitly a challenge to 
unique public duties.92 The dissenting judgment in Schacht v O’Rourke was the 
closest the Supreme Court has ever come to considering whether Crown Liability 
legislation precludes unique duties of care.93 The majority did not address the issue. 
Arguments based on the Crown liability statutes are seldom raised and seldom 
successful today.94 The legislatures have apparently acquiesced.95 It is highly 
                                                 
87 Hogg, Monahan and Wade, supra note 5 at 218–19. 
 
88 This is a principle of formal equality.  As such it is vulnerable to the criticism that employing it to defeat 
a claim such as Michael allows form to triumph over substance.  In part, the answer is that a unique public 
duty is not necessary to allow Michael claimants to succeed.  In part, the answer is that formal divisions of 
constitutional power are core principles of how we are governed.  They are not “mere” formalities and 
toying with them is very likely to produce substantial social change.  As such, the question of whether the 
courts ought to create unique public duties is deserving of transparent debate, something that has not 
happened in the Canadian courts.  
 
89 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, SC 1990, c 8, s 20; amended SC 2001, c 4, s 3(b)(1); Proceedings 
Against the Crown Act, RSA 2000, c P-25, s 5(1)(a);  Proceedings Against the Crown Act, CCSM, c P140, s 
4(1)(a) (excluding liability for economic loss);  Proceedings Against the Crown Act, RSNL 1990, c P-26; 
Proceedings Against the Crown Act, RSNS 1989, c 360, s 5(1)(a);  Crown Proceedings Act, RSPEI 1988, c 
C-32, s 4(1)(a); Proceedings Against the Crown Act, RSS 1978, c P-27, s 5(1)(a);  and Proceedings Against 
the Crown Act, RSO 1990, c P27, s 5(1)(a).  Canada and all the common law provinces except BC also 
have a provision substantially identical to s 10 of the federal Act which reads as follows: 
10. No proceedings lie against the Crown . . .  in respect of any act or omission of a 
servant of the Crown unless the act or omission would, apart from the provisions of 
this Act, have given rise to a cause of action for liability against that servant or the 
servant’s personal representative or succession. 
This historical immunity was constitutional, based on separation of powers, not on tort doctrine.  
 
90 Hogg, Monohan & Wade, supra note 5 at 261 use these terms and support this proposition. See also 
Norman Siebrasse, “Liability of Public Authorities and Duties of Affirmative Action” (2007) 57 UNBLJ 
84; and Lewis Klar, “Tort Liability of the Crown: Back to Canada: Saskatchewan Wheat Pool” (2006-
2007) 32 Advocates Q 293 at 294. 
 
91 Crown Proceeding Act, RSBC 1996, c 89, s 2(c).  
 
92  Swinamer v Nova Scotia (AG), [1994] 1 SCR 445 at 462–3, 129 NSR (2d) 321.     
 
93 Schacht, supra note 17.  
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doubtful an argument that unique public duties are precluded by the Crown Liability 
legislation would succeed today. My point is simply that the idea of limiting 
government liability to the same rules that govern private parties is not foreign to 
Canadian constitutional law. 
 
Moreover, until at least 1989, the Supreme Court also acknowledged a 
common law rule precluding recognition of unique public duties in municipal 
government cases where the Crown Liability statutes do not apply. The famous 
decision Welbridge Holdings v Winnipeg applied the rule to deny liability.96 
Kamloops v Nielsen recognized the same rule but did not apply it.97 Justice Cory also 
appeared to favour the Diceyan approach in Just.98 This common law prohibition 
against unique public duties has never been explicitly overruled, or even criticized. It 
simply disappeared. It too can no longer be considered a viable legal argument. The 
most one can say is that concerns about unique public duties are neither novel in 
Canadian law, nor radical. At one time this was how courts themselves defined the 
division of power between courts and legislative bodies.  
 
Today there are numerous Supreme Court precedents for the recognition of 
unique public duties. This in itself legitimizes an attempt to establish a unique police 
duty to govern the Michael situation. However, none of these precedents are directly 
on point. A quick summary below of the unique police duty cases suggests that any 
unique public duty created to govern the Michael situation would be a “novel” duty 
requiring a full Anns/Cooper analysis.99  
 
The first unique public duty of care in Canada was established in a police 
case, Schacht v O’Rourke.100 A police officer attended at a traffic accident and then 
                                                                                                                   
94 No one pays any attention to the distinction today. See Hogg, Monahan & Wade supra note 5 at 182–3; 
Williams v Canada (AG), 76 OR (3d) 763, 257 DLR (4th) 704, varied on other grounds; and Davidson v 
Canada, 2015 ONSC 8008, 262 ACWS (3d) 648.  
 
95 It is difficult to feel any sympathy for governments who could have, and presumably still could, put an 
end to unique public duties by legislation.  This article is not premised on the need to protect the 
government.  It is premised on the need to distinguish properly governance from common law 
adjudication in the interests of all citizens. A proper distinction benefits both the legislatures and the 
courts.  
 
96 Welbridge Holdings v Winnipeg, supra note 73. Welbridge has never been overruled and may be 
undergoing a modern revival. See, e.g. 118143 Ontario Inc v Mississauga (City), 2016 ONCA 620, 405 
DLR (4th) 338.  
 
97 Justice Wilson expressed concern about creating unique public duties pertaining to pure economic loss 
in Kamloops, supra note 17 at 27.  She did not raise that concern on the basic by-law enforcement issue. 
One possible explanation may be that liability in Kamloops was premised on improper government 
conduct, not simple negligence. See infra note 131. 
 
98 Just, supra note 6.  
 
99 Anns, supra note 12.  In fact, the SCC regards every case involving a public defendant as a “novel” 
case. See Jost Blom, “Do We Really Need the Anns Test for Duty of Care in Negligence?” (2016) 53 Alta 
L R 895 at 905. 
 
100 Schacht, supra note 17. 
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left the scene without notifying the proper authorities about the remaining dangers at 
the scene. The court recognized a new common law duty based on a statutory duty to 
maintain a “traffic patrol.” The majority held that this included a duty to notify 
possible road users of any foreseeable dangers arising from the original accident. The 
decision in Schacht was clearly statute-specific and thus not a direct precedent for 
the Michael scenario.101 Moreover, Schacht might not be decided the same way 
today. The Supreme Court has subsequently held that it is impermissible to create a 
new common law duty of care based on the words of the statute alone, as it did in 
Schacht.102  
 
In the most recent unique police duty case, Ohavji, a deceased criminal 
suspect’s family was allowed to proceed with an action for psychiatric damage 
against the Chief of Police. The action was based on the Chief’s failure to compel his 
officers to assist with an SIU investigation into the suspect’s death at the hands of the 
police.103 The basis of decision on the negligence point was unclear, highly unusual, 
and of no direct relevance to a case like Michael. 
 
The recognition of a novel duty of care owed by investigating police 
officers to criminal suspects recognized in Hill v Hamilton is not a unique public 
duty. That duty is entirely consistent with the principle in private party negligence 
law that imposes affirmative obligations in special relationships of control.104  
 
Jane Doe v Toronto105 is a lower court decision. It is otherwise the most 
useful precedent for a unique police duty in a Michael situation, and as I will argue 
later, more broadly.106 The action was brought by a woman who had been raped by 
an intruder whom the police suspected to be a serial rapist with an established modis 
operandi based on entry via lower floor climbable apartment balconies within a 
small geographical area. The court held that the police owed a unique public duty to 
a limited class of potential rape victims to investigate crime with due care, and 
specifically owed a duty to warn the plaintiffs so they could protect 
themselves. There was an additional finding of liability based on a breach of the 
plaintiff’s Charter right to gender equality resulting in an identical award of 
damages. Adherence to rape myths as well as sexist stereotypical reasoning about 
                                                 
101 The majority suggested that there was common law authority for a unique public duty in such a case. 
Ibid at 86.  The cases cited show only that a police officer has special public duties, but are not authorities 
for unique public tort duties. 
 
102 See, e.g. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, supra note 18. 
 
103 Odhavji, supra note 17 at para 4. This decision is better known for its elaboration on the intentional tort 
of misfeasance in public office.  No criticism is intended to the holding on that point, which is not relevant 
to the unique negligence duty.  
 
104 See 175–177, above. 
 
105 Jane Doe, supra note 43. 
 
106 See infra note 167.  
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rape, about women, and about women who are raped motivated and informed the 
failure to warn. Women were treated differently because some members of the force 
adhered to sexist notions that, if warned, women would panic and scare off the 
attacker. The negligence analysis was also infused with concern about the 
discriminatory treatment. It is unclear whether the negligence claim would have been 
decided the same way absent the gender discrimination.107   
 
Police failures to respond effectively to domestic violence complaints have 
often been studied through the lens of systemic gender discrimination.108 If 
supporting evidence of unlawful discrimination is available, it would certainly help 
advance the effort to establish a unique police duty in a case like Michael. Moreover, 
the Charter breach aspect would remove any constitutional objection to the 
recognition of the unique duty. Courts have every right to address Charter 
breaches. The only remaining question would be whether a negligence duty is 
necessary, or whether the Charter remedy is sufficient. 
 
 
C. The General Challenges with Unique Duties of Care 
 
The basic question with unique public duties concerns the relationship between the 
government and its citizens. Relational matters are properly dealt with as questions 
of proximity. The distinction between inflicting harm and failing to prevent it is a 
fundamental distinction in our law.109 The proximity test is different for nonfeasance 
than for misfeasance. Proximity is a challenging concept to define succinctly.  
McLachlin CJC put it this way in Childs v Desormeaux:110  
 
The law of negligence not only considers the plaintiff’s loss, but explains 
why it is just and fair to impose the cost of that loss on the particular 
defendant before the court.  The proximity requirement captures this two-
sided face of negligence. 
 
As explained in the earlier review of private party negligence law, the general rule is 
that one party does not owe a duty to convey a benefit to another. This is so even 
when the parties are in as close a relationship to one another as they were in Michael. 
The plaintiff must establish a special relationship of control or an assumption of 
responsibility to succeed. The failure to have done so is what would drive the 
plaintiff to seek to establish a unique public duty. The argument for a unique public 
                                                 
107 But see Mooney, supra note 9.  At trial a police officer was held to owe a duty of care to investigate 
and prevent crime, but the claim failed on causation on appeal with little discussion of the duty itself. 
 
108 Mooney, supra note 9. 
 
109 Supra note 25 and Childs, supra note 7. 
 
110 Childs, supra note 7 at para 25. Childs involved a claim against a social host brought by a victim of an 
auto accident caused by an impaired guest.  The claim was dismissed on proximity grounds, not step two 
Anns grounds.  The proximity grounds were rooted in the distinction between causing harm and failing to 
provide a benefit. See also Cooper, supra note 16 at paras 34–35. 
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duty must depend on arguments that distinguish public from private defendants. The 
plaintiff may not rely solely on statutory public duties to draw that distinction.111    
 
The generally accepted rationales for the “no duty” rule are respect for 
individual autonomy,112 concerns about potentially indeterminate liability, and the 
difficulty of singling out one defendant among many who might have conferred the 
benefit.113 None of these rationales apply to public defendants who fail to protect 
citizens from physical harm. This clears the deck for an argument in favour of unique 
duties relating to public benefits. It does not, however, make that case.  
 
A number of arguments for unique public duties of general application have 
been advanced.114  In my opinion, none are compelling in substance. Even if they 
were, imagine the outcome if these general principles were applied across the board 
to all public benefits, as they ought to be according to the principle of stare decisis. 
In such a scenario, it is difficult to identify what would remain of the distinction 
between a judicial function and a legislative one.   
 
One argument in favour of unique public duties generally is that public 
benefits are not purely gratuitous.  Citizens pay tax to support public benefits. 
However, taxes are not paid in exchange for a specific public benefit, or for a 
particular quality of a specific public benefit, as would be the case, for example, in a 
contract. Paying tax does not convey a right to receive a particular benefit. While 
governments may not deserve the praise that might be accorded to a Good Private 
Samaritan, from the recipients’ point of view a government benefit is still a 
gratuitous benefit.  
 
A similar argument based on “general reliance” is sometimes raised in 
support of unique public duties. General reliance usually means only that citizens 
expect public authorities to conduct their operations without negligence.115 Assuming 
                                                 
111 See e.g. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, supra note 18. 
 
112 Of the three, autonomy is paramount.  In Michael, supra note 1 at para 177, Lord Kerr dissenting said 
“whereas it is arguable that a private individual's freedom has an intrinsic value in its contribution to an 
autonomous life, the value of the state's freedom is instrumental and lies in the contribution that it makes 
to the fulfilment of its proper functions.” 
 
113 McBride, “Michael Comment”, supra note 4 at 9, summarizing Tofaris & Steel, “Police Liability”, 
supra note 36.  See also Tofaris & Steel, “Omissions”, supra note 36 at 129–133; McBride & Bagshaw, 
supra note 33 at 216–219; and Siebrasse, supra note 90 at 87.    
 
114 By general arguments I mean those that apply across the board to any situation to which the relevant 
principle applies. For example, the duty to avoid causing foreseeable physical damage to a foreseeable 
plaintiff applies generally to almost every potential defendant and plaintiff.  It is not limited to product 
manufactures and consumers, the situation from which it was derived. Duties based on assumptions of 
responsibly apply generally to almost every potential defendant and plaintiff, not only to bankers or 
professional persons. See, e.g. Mutual Life and Citizen’s Assurance Co v Evatt, [1971] AC 793 (PC). The 
principle takes into account the factual differences between professional advisors and others.    
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that were true, as the Chief Justice reminded us, it remains to justify imposing the 
cost of their disappointments on the defendant.116 General reliance is not situation-
specific reliance between parties in a closely proximate relationship based on an 
assumption of responsibility that produces detrimental reliance.   
 
Most of the recognized unique public duties in Canada are based on the 
general principle that once a public defendant begins to exercise a discretionary 
power, it then comes under a duty to exercise the power with reasonable care.  I call 
this the Good Public Samaritan liability principle.117 A clear example is the 
recognized unique public duty imposed on municipalities that decide to exercise their 
discretionary statutory power to operate a residential home inspection program. Once 
the municipality implements the program, the Canadian courts require that the 
inspections be performed with reasonable care. This is a unique public duty. The idea 
that a Good Private Samaritan should incur legal responsibilities simply by 
beginning to offer a benefit, while one who does nothing would not, has never been 
established in private party negligence law,118 except in the case of professionals like 
doctors and lawyers.119  
 
There are problems with this Good Public Samaritan liability principle. It 
became prominent after a simple, unsupported conclusion drawn by Lord 
Wilberforce in Anns.120 Neither he, nor the many Canadian judges who have 
                                                                                                                   
115 Invercargill City Council v Hamilton, [1994] 3 NZLR 513 (CA); aff’d [1996] 2 WLR 367 (PC). 
Although general reliance typically arises in public authority negligence actions, it is discussed in both the 
private and public sectors in Childs, supra note 7 at para 40. 
 
116 This is similar to the argument that while it might be reasonable to rely on financial reports prepared by 
a national accounting firm as having been prepared with due care, that does not justify liability unless the 
firm did something to intend or induce the reliance. See Perry, supra note 62 at 285. 
 
117 So far, the Supreme Court has only applied this principle where there is a safety rationale. See 194–
196, below. 
 
118 See especially Horsely v MacLaren, [1970] 2 OR 487, 11 DLR (3d) 277 (CA) per Jessup J. See also 
HR Moch v Rensselaer Water, 159 NE 896 (1928) (NYCA). Whenever the Good Samaritan liability 
principle it is mentioned in private party negligence law it usually turns out that the decision was based on 
a sounder principle.  See e.g. Zelenko v Gimbel Brothers, supra note 28.  If it were established in the UK, 
presumably the unique public duty discussion in Michael would have been unnecessary. If the Good 
Samaritan liability rule were adopted generally as opposed to exceptionally in private law, I believe it 
would then be necessary to argue that the rule not apply to public defendants because it would be over-
broad in application to governments who are constantly delivering public benefits.  It is not necessary to 
deal with this complication here.    
 
119 Later I will suggest that a good case could be made for extending this line of authority to the police. 
See 198, below. 
 
120 “Passing then to the duty as regards inspection, if made. On principle there must surely be a duty to 
exercise reasonable care.” Anns, supra note 12 at 755. This conclusion would also seem to violate the rule 
now followed in England and Canada that a common law duty cannot be based on a statutory public duty 
alone. See supra note 18. The Good Public Samaritan rule has since been adopted regularly by the 
Supreme Court of Canada with no further justification or explanation. See e.g. Kamloops, supra note at 
17; Just, supra note 6 at 1242–3; Rothfield v Manolakos, [1989] 2 SCR 1259 at 1266, 41 BCLR (2d) 374; 
Ingles v Tutkaluk Construction, 2000 SCC 12 at para 17, [2001] 1 SCR 298. There are many pre-Michael 
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followed him, have ever offered any justification, doctrinal or otherwise, for such a 
rule. Anns itself has since been overruled in the UK.121 There is no apparent reason 
why the defendant’s voluntary provision of a gratuitous benefit, standing alone, 
should confer a right on an unharmed plaintiff to receive the benefit. Nor is it sound 
policy to discourage Good Samaritans.122 It is better to allow the public to obtain 
some public benefits, albeit imperfect, than none.123 That said, it is not my purpose to 
suggest that the housing inspection or similar highway maintenance lines of authority 
should be overruled. I do not foresee this happening.124 Rather, I want to use the 
Good Public Samaritan liability principle to illustrate a more fundamental 
constitutional problem with unique public duties of care.  
 
Governments are in the business of providing public benefits: health, safety, 
education, transportation, housing, culture, recreation, and so on. Governments have 
limited budgets. Allocating a limited budget among competing claims for public 
benefits is a political task. Judicial supervision exists quite properly to ensure that the 
government respects the recognized legal rights of its citizens. These include the 
right not to be discriminated against on prohibited grounds, the right to be governed 
honestly and in good faith, the right to receive mandatory entitlements, and the right 
to enjoy the same protections from government as from private citizens in basic tort 
law. Imposing a standard of “reasonable care” on the provision of discretionary 
benefits absent an interference with such rights is different.   
 
What does it mean to provide a reasonable public benefit? This does not 
pose much difficulty in a case like Michael.  Recognized public service providers 
like police or firefighters develop professional standards for basic services. What it 
means to perform a discretionary municipal house inspection, or highway inspection, 
with reasonable care is a different question. There is no professional standard, 
contract or representation to set the standard. Later, I will suggest that professional 
status may help found a principled distinction within the ordinary common law 
between public rescue providers and others.125 For now, I will concentrate on the 
inspection-type cases.  
                                                                                                                   
applications of the Good Public Samaritan rule in the UK. See generally McBride, “Michael Comment”, 
supra note 4. 
 
121 Supra note 15. 
 
122 Rights theorists abhor such instrumentalist arguments. See e.g. Donal Nolan, “Revisiting the Liability 
of Public Authorities for Omissions” (2014) 130 LQR 21 at 24. However, it is pointless to ignore 
economic reality. A public authority who failed to include potential liability in predicting the cost of a 
discretionary program or action would be negligent. 
 
123 See McBride, “Michael Comment”, supra note 4 at 10. 
 
124 It is more realistic to suggest that the Good Public Samaritan liability principle will not readily be 
further extended. See e.g. Vlanich v Typhair, 2016 ONCA 517, 131 OR (3d) 353 [Vlanich]. 
 
125 See 199, below. As to the importance of there being a recognized standard of behaviour to justify 
judicial intervention, see David Cohen, “The Public and Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem” 
(1984) 8 Can Bus LJ 410 at 421. 
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For the sake of argument assume accepted standards exist within the for-
profit house inspection industry and that the courts could adopt those as a definition 
of “reasonable.” But why should the government be required to meet a private 
market standard? Why, as an exercise in governance, should the government not be 
permitted to adopt instead a lesser standard of inspection, call it a “modest” 
standard.126 The government could combine this with modest benefits to tennis 
players who use public courts and modest benefits to library users, and so on. Or the 
combination could include modest benefits to home buyers and generous benefits to 
tennis players, and no benefits to library users. A great many different combinations 
are possible given the number of benefits being distributed.  
 
When a court decides that new home owners are entitled to “industry-
standard” or otherwise defined “reasonable” inspections, not the modest programs 
preferred by the legislature, additional costs will be imposed on the municipalities. 
These costs are not related to the infringements of recognized rights. These costs 
might encourage the defendant to stop providing the discretionary benefit altogether. 
They might encourage “better” inspection practices and better outcomes for some 
fortunate home buyers. If so, some other claimants, library users perhaps, will 
receive fewer benefits than the municipality would have given them otherwise. Or 
the municipality might raise taxes. Are these outcomes more “reasonable” than the 
benefit combination decided upon by the municipality? What is a reasonable benefit 
allocation? Surely these are political questions, not justiciable questions.   
 
A more deferential approach might be for the courts to take the “modest” 
benefit program as a given, but require the government to deliver that program with 
reasonable care. This is how some would define actionable “operational” 
negligence.127 The policy-operational continuum was introduced to Canadian law via 
Anns as a vehicle with which to determine whether the government ought to be 
immune from tort law in particular cases. The continuum approach has since been 
abandoned in the UK,128 and the quest to identify operational negligence has been 
abandoned in Canada.129 Liability for unreasonable program implementation is no 
different than liability for unreasonable program definition.130 They both amount to 
                                                 
126 There are different ways in which an inspection program might fall below industry standard. For 
example, there could be fewer inspections, less extensive inspections, or a less adequately supervised 
programs with a higher error rate than in the private sector. 
 
127 This was introduced by McLachlin J as she then was at trial in Just v BC, [1985] 5 WWR 570 at 576, 
64 BCLR 34 (SC).  
 
128 As pointed out in R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, supra note 6 at para 78, the House of Lords 
declared the “policy/operational distinction unworkable in difficult cases, a point said to be evidenced by 
the Canadian jurisprudence: Stovin v Wise, [1996] AC 923 (HL), per Lord Hoffmann.”   
 
129 See e.g. Imperial Tobacco, supra note 6 at para 78..  
 
130 Anns itself was equivocal about whether policy implementation should be assessed on a standard of 
reasonable care (hence based on a unique public duty) or a standard of good faith (an entirely appropriate 
condition precedent for the legitimate exercise of government power). See Anns, supra note 12 at 755. 
Kamloops carried this equivocation into Canadian law. See Kamloops, supra note 17 at 24–25.  The actual 
decision in Kamloops was based on improper conduct by the municipality, not negligence. See Kamloops, 
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the court requiring the government to redefine its public benefit package, abandoning 
some programs, allocating more money to some and less to others. They both require 
the public defendant to deliver a certain standard of gratuitous service to an 
unharmed citizen. 131 
 
Courts lack the institutional competence to allocate public benefits amongst 
competing claims.132 Two-party litigation is an inadequate vantage point from which 
to take all relevant considerations into account.133 But the more fundamental reason 
why courts should decline to become involved in allocative policy that does not 
infringe the rights of citizens is constitutional. Allocative policy with respect to 
public benefits, good or bad, is the essence of governance.  Governments should be 
entitled to select whom to benefit and how. That is politics. Courts should make sure 
governments respect the public law and private law rights of citizens when 
governments define and deliver the benefits. That is the judicial function.  
 
Although the argument against unique public duties derives support from 
rights-based torts scholars, it is a different argument that can stand by itself. Rights-
based scholars object to the courts attempting to achieve distributive justice by 
pursuing policy goals. They believe that the function of negligence law is corrective 
justice. Citizens enjoy a primary right to security of the person and property. A 
negligent defendant who interferes with these rights should be required to restore the 
status quo ante by paying restitutionary damages.134 The case against unique public 
duties, in contrast, must take as given all established private party tort duties 
including those based on distributive policy goals to which the rights-based 
scholarships would object. For example, if the common law were to recognize 
generally a legal duty based on a moral obligation to rescue another from injury or 
death, under the Diceyan approach that duty should also apply to public 
                                                                                                                   
supra note 17 at 24.  The dissent in Kamloops did not believe the evidence supported a finding of 
impropriety and therefore declined to recognize a unique public duty. Since then, Canadian courts have 
varied in the degree to which bad faith is stressed over negligence. On the bad faith side see e.g. Froese v 
Hik, 78 BCLR (2d) 389, [1993] BCWLD 1405 per Huddart J as she then was, approved in 
Foley v Shamess, 2008 ONCA 588, 297 DLR (4th) 287. See also City of Toronto v Polai, [1970] 1 OR 
483, 8 DLR (3d) 689, upheld in [1973] SCR 38, 28 DLR (3d) 638.  On the simple negligence side see e.g. 
Oosthoek v Corporation of the City of Thunder Bay, 30 OR (3d) 323, 139 DLR (4th) 611(CA), leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed September 26, 1997; and Rausch v Pickering (City), 
2013 ONCA 740, 369 DLR (4th) 691. 
 
131 In contrast, with an assumption of responsibility approach based on induced actual reliance the 
defendant may undertake to perform its services according to its accepted practices.  
 
132 David Cohen & JC Smith, “Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public Law” 
(1986) 64 Can Bar Rev 1 at 10–11, and sources cited therein at n 73. 
 
133 Ibid at 8. 
 
134 See e.g. Beever, supra note 66 at 211; Benson, supra note 25; Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private 
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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defendants.135 The case against judicial policy-making in private party negligence is 
a different case that must be made separately. It need not be made at all for the 
purposes of this article.   
 
We can look at this another way. When a court imposes negligence liability 
on policy grounds it will affect the distribution of wealth. It is understandable that 
some people believe that courts and legislatures should each have a role to play in 
effecting distributive justice generally. Unique public duties, however, affect the 
distribution of wealth in a particular way, by affecting the distribution of government 
benefits. Government benefits, by definition, are created and delivered by the 
government. Citizens enjoy substantial rights against their governments. The courts’ 
job is to enforce those rights, not to supervise discretionary benefits beyond this.  
 
The principled objection to unique public duties is grounded in Dicey’s 
equality principle. There are also policy concerns. Courts do continue to employ the 
Good Public Samarian principle in new situations when it suits them.136 There might 
come a tipping point at some stage. However, I do not base my concerns about 
unique public duties on any expectation that they will cause an imminent 
constitutional or financial crisis. The courts are usually very cautious about 
extending the Good Public Samaritan liability principle as far as formal logic would 
otherwise take it. This necessary judicial deference leads to the definition and 
distribution of public benefits on an apparently ad hoc basis. In so doing the courts 
undermine their own credibility.   
 
The doctrine of stare decisis requires courts to treat like cases alike.137 
There are literally thousands of public benefits regularly conveyed to citizens by 
their governments. Many are distinguishable from the inspection situation. Many are 
not. Strictly speaking, the courts ought to extend the Good Public Samaritan liability 
principle across the board to any situation in which the government operates a public 
benefit program that is in principle similar to the inspection benefit. Thanks to the 
good sense of most judges, this has not happened. If it did, many, perhaps most 
government benefits would have to achieve a court-defined standard of reasonable 
care. Public administration would become overwhelmingly judicialized. The existing 
division of powers between the courts and the legislatures would not merely shift, it 
would be entirely redefined. 
 
Voluntary judicial restraint in employing the Good Public Samaritan 
principle across the board is necessary and commendable, but it comes with a cost. It 
                                                 
135 Tofaris and Steel make this argument to support a unique duty of care. See “Omissions”, supra note 36 
at 142–145.  Later I will suggest the same outcome can be accomplished via basic common law 
negligence.     
 
136 See e.g. Fullowka, supra note 17; Rausch, supra note 130.  
 
137 True, this is an uncertain and fungible exercise. Some would argue stare decisis is more an exercise in 
justification than in logic. Regardless, there are limits to the fungibility. For example, I suggest these 
limits were exceeded in Vlanich, supra note 124. 
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is difficult, perhaps impossible, to predict or justify when the Good Public Samaritan 
principle will be invoked and when it will not.138 For example, the Supreme Court 
has recognized unique public duties in the areas of highway safety,139 workplace 
safety,140 and building construction.141 There seems to be a “safety” theme.  
However, Health Canada does not owe a duty to consumers when it approves for sale 
defective medical devices such as jaw or breast implants.142 Why is there proximity 
between the police or highway maintenance crews and ordinary road users, even in 
the absence of specific reliance, but not between consumers of medical devices who 
did specifically rely on the defendants’ product approval posted on their website? 
Why are highway accidents, where insurance cover is prevalent, or structural 
building defects that are easily discovered by consumers hiring a private inspector, 
more worthy of exceptional intervention than other cases like the medical device 
cases? No principled answers to these questions appear in the reasons for judgment.  
The Canadian exceptions appear to be purely ad hoc.143 This is damaging to the 
structure of the common law.144  
 
 
5.  Difficulties with Unique Public Duties in Exceptional Circumstances 
 
Suppose that one accepts the aversion to unique rules of general application for 
public defendants. Should there be exceptions in exceptional cases? The substantive 
case against unique public duties is based on a particular view about the distinction 
between the legislative function and the judicial function. I cannot identify an 
exceptional case that would not violate this distinction. Therefore, I would prefer a 
                                                 
138 Unfairness among potential beneficiaries is a problem. See McBride and Bagshaw, supra note 33 at 
218. 
 
139 Schacht, supra note 17; Just, supra note 6. 
 
140 Fullowka, supra note 17 
 
141 Kamloops, supra note 17. 
 
142 Drady v Canada, 2008 ONCA 659 at para 52, 300 DLR (4th) 443, leave to appeal refused [2008] 
SCCA No 492; and Attis v Canada, 2008 ONCA 660 at para 77, 93 OR (3d) 35, leave to appeal refused 
[2008] SCCA No 491. 
 
143 See Erika Chamberlain “To Serve and Protect Whom? Proximity in Cases of Police Failure to Protect” 
(2016) 53 Alta L Rev 977 [Chamberlain, “Serve and Protect”] where the author exposes several poorly 
reasoned lower court decisions about police duties to protect victims of crime. 
 
144 Consider the dilemma the court faced in Vlanich, supra note 124.  The plaintiff relied on the unique 
inspection cases and the underlying Good Public Samaritan liability principle to argue that the defendant 
owed it a duty to enforce its bylaws with reasonable care. The Court of Appeal felt compelled to 
“distinguish” the inspection cases by stating that the inspection authorities had “invited the injured party to 
rely on an inspection, and it has assumed responsibility for avoiding the risk.” See para 32. Of course, the 
inspection duties were not based on either induced transaction-specific reliance or an assumption of 
responsibility. Suggesting otherwise was probably the only way in which the Court of Appeal could 
reconcile the lack of proximity with the doctrine of stare decisis.   
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clean and clear across-the-board prohibition against unique public duties.145 
However, others will prefer to draw the line differently in exceptional cases based on 
the quest for “good” judicial interventions into what otherwise would be the 
legislative sphere. I suggest that acceptable exceptions must 1) distinguish 
meaningfully those cases where an exception is justified; and 2) keep the exception 
sufficiently narrow that the existing division of powers between the legislative and 
judicial branch is not radically altered.146 It may be possible to meet these conditions, 
but I have only seen one, a proposal by Tofaris and Steel, that has done so.147 It 
justifies the exception based on important differences between the status of the 
police and that of ordinary citizens. Ironically, their proposal is unnecessary. I 
conclude this section by suggesting that any plaintiff who can satisfy the Tofaris and 
Steel conditions for a unique public duty would succeed, probably more easily, under 
basic Canadian private party negligence law.  
 
The Canadian unique public duty cases tend to be safety-based, intended to 
reduce personal injury and death. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
provides a strong precedent for prioritizing personal security over property rights. 
General negligence law recognizes fundamental distinctions between physical 
damage and pure economic loss based on both principle and policy.148 There seems 
to be little judicial appetite for expanding recovery for pure economic loss beyond its 
relatively limited scope today.149 All unique public duties effectively create a limited 
taxpayer-funded insurance scheme.150 The arguments for having to insure someone 
in Ms. Michael’s position are compelling. The arguments for insuring someone’s 
interest in receiving a gratuitous financial benefit are less so, especially if they are 
effectively able to obtain such protection themselves.151 Refusing to recognize novel 
unique public duties concerning public benefits relating to property or purely 
economic interests would be a step in the right direction.152   
 
Recall that governments will routinely be held liable for misfeasance that 
interferes with the right to personal security. Unique public duties would be directed 
                                                 
145 I would also prefer to employ this approach instead of the immunity approach.     
 
146 These are limits I would propose for unilateral action by the courts. The legislature is free, subject to 
claims of right, to select which constituencies it wishes to benefit and which not. 
 
147 Tofaris & Steel, “Police Liability”, supra note 36; and Tofaris & Steel, “Omissions”, supra note 36. 
 
148 See e.g. Benson, supra note 25 at 865; Beever, supra note 66 at 214; Canadian National Railway Co v 
Norsk Pacific Steamship Co, [1992] 1 SCR 1021, 91 DLR (4th) 289 per La Forest J dissenting, eventually 
adopted by the court in Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 
1210, 153 DLR (4th) 385.  
 
149 Recovery for one type of pure economic loss, dangerously defective housing construction, is well-
entrenched in the inspection cases. This would have to be carved off somehow.   
 
150 See e.g. Cooper, supra note 16 at para 55. 
 
151 There is a significant difference in being able to purchase a standard home inspection and being able to 
replace police emergency services on the private market.  
152 See Vlanich, supra note 124 at para 31. 
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to the failure to take reasonable steps to protect citizens from such interferences in 
advance. The problem is that governments are deeply involved in benefit programs 
with a safety rationale. In order to avoid judicializing an enormous range of 
government power, we cannot accept a general health and safety justification, or 
even a safety justification alone, for unique duties of care. We have to further narrow 
the justification.  It is, however, difficult in a common law system to distinguish in 
principle an imminent risk from a long term risk, or a safety rationale from a health 
rationale. The home inspection duty allows recovery of pure economic loss on a 
safety rationale. Based on stare decisis this could be extended. It remains to be seen 
whether some safety-based benefits can be distinguished in principle from others.   
 
One possibility is to attempt to draw a distinction between “targeted” public 
duties and duties that exist for the benefit of the general public. This distinction was 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper v Hobart153 and is frequently 
invoked by the courts. It may be a principled distinction, but it is totally conclusory. 
Every duty derived from a statute has a general public aspect, and, like in Cooper, a 
class of persons who are more directly affected than members of the general public. 
Is the purpose of the emergency service in Michael targeted towards potential 
victims of crime, or towards crime prevention generally?154 Does that question really 
help to distinguish Cooper from Michael? If the legislature intends to confer private 
benefits on targeted individuals, it should create statutory torts to that effect. The 
search for targeted duties adds nothing to the discussion.155 
 
A proposal by Tofaris and Steel to adopt a particular duty of care owed by 
the police to protect citizens from the criminal acts of others has received favorable 
attention in the UK.156 In 2014 the authors stated their proposition as follows:157 
 
 . . .  a finding of proximity should arise where the following factors are 
satisfied: 
(i) The claimant is at a special risk of personal harm, i.e., a greater risk 
than the general public. The circumstances in which the risk will be special 
must be left to the courts to develop on a case-by-case basis. Guidance on 
this can be found in the New Zealand case Couch v Attorney-General, 
where the majority held that “the necessary risk must be… special in the 
sense that the plaintiff’s individual circumstances, or her membership of 
the necessary class rendered her particularly vulnerable to suffering harm 
                                                 
153  Cooper, supra note 16 at para 38. 
 
154 Tofaris and Steel claim it is the former. See “Omissions”, supra note 36 at 154–155.  I suggest there is 
no possible way to answer the question definitively.   
 
155 See also Nolan, supra note 122.  
 
156 The recommendations made in Tofaris & Steel, “Police Liability”, supra note 36 at 5 were quoted in 
dissent by Lady Hale in Michael, supra note 1 at para 189. See also at para 197 per Lady Hale, and at 
paras 178–181 per Lord Kerr dissenting.  
 
157 Tofaris & Steel, “Police Liability”, supra note 36 at 5.  
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of the relevant kind” from the third party. In any case, there is no doubt 
that a person facing a specific threat to her physical safety from a specific 
individual is at a special risk. 
(ii) The police are aware or should have reasonably been aware that the 
claimant is at a special risk of personal harm.  
(iii) The police are given special powers by law to protect the class of 
persons to which the claimant belongs, i.e., members of the public at a 
special risk of physical harm. 
(iv) The claimant is dependent upon the police as regards protection 
against the risk on the basis of the legal and civic duties imposed on her to 
inform the police about the incident and to refrain from taking measures 
beyond reasonable self-protection and/or her vulnerability in the sense that 
she cannot be reasonably expected to protect herself adequately against 
that risk. 
 
Inexplicably, the 2016 version of their proposal omits the following requirement: 
“and/or her vulnerability in the sense that she cannot be reasonably expected to 
protect herself adequately against that risk.”158 
 
This is a “good” proposal, excellent according to my untrained eye. It deals 
only with special risks of personal harm, a type of risk with more moral and legal 
significance than property damage or economic loss. Restricting the duty to police, 
and to a limited class in a limited set of circumstances, certainly minimizes the scope 
of the judicial intrusion into the legislative realm. But my objection to unique public 
duties is not based on whether or not they are “good” duties.  Some are, some are 
not, and usually it is difficult to tell.   
 
One may quibble with the proposal. The more specific we are in defining 
the exception, the more likely that we will exclude other situations that are not 
distinguishable in principle. Lords Toulson’s and Kerr’s sparring over several 
options in Michael illustrates this. Why are dangers posed by a third party different 
from other risks to life and limb? Why police, but not other emergency responders 
like firefighters? Does an imminent safety risk warrant different treatment from an 
imminent health risk, for example, or even a long term risk of industrial disease? 
One may still ask why, unless the police were in some way specifically responsible 
for the risk of criminal attacks by others, ought there to be a unique public duty? 
How confident are we that the proposed rules will actually increase the degree of 
protection the police currently offer to potential victims of criminal attacks?159     
 
Despite these quibbles, I find it difficult to argue strenuously against 
liability under the Tofaris and Steel conditions. The more interesting question is 
whether this specific and narrowly crafted unique public duty is necessary, at least in 
Canada. I suggest not. Basic common law negligence should be able to accomplish 
the same goals.  
                                                 
158 Tofaris & Steel, “Omissions”, supra note 36 at 151. 
 
159 For a fascinating take on this problem see Margaret Hall, “Theorizing the Institutional Tortfeasor” 
(2016) 53 Alta L Rev 995. 
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Tofaris and Steel propose their novel police duty against the background of 
botched emergency responses such as those in Michael. As previously discussed, that 
particular situation can be effectively resolved by the basic rules of Canadian 
negligence law governing an assumption of responsibility. Canadian courts already 
require a special relationship of proximity between the citizen and the public 
defendant that is closer than the relationship between the defendant and the general 
public or even from other members of the class most directly affected by the public 
benefit at issue.160 Near privity is required in a negligent misrepresentation action. 
The most the plaintiff should have to establish is that the defendant intended, 
induced or invited her to rely on the defendant; that she reasonably and foreseeably 
did so; and possibly that she suffered foreseeable detrimental reliance loss as a 
consequence. The Tofaris and Steel conditions would be more demanding of 
claimants.   
 
It is difficult to imagine that a party who reaches a police emergency line 
and sets out a request for police protection from imminent physical harm or death 
could fail to meet the first two Tofaris and Steel conditions. The authors believe their 
proposal goes further than the common law because it would apply in the case where 
the emergency operator was listening to music and simply did not answer the call. I 
would argue that situation could also culminate in a duty of care under basic 
Canadian negligence law. By providing the service the force is assuming 
responsibility by intending and inducing a limited and vulnerable class of persons 
whose personal safety is at risk to rely on the service being provided with reasonable 
care. Listening to music instead of answering emergency calls breaches that duty. 
Refusing to answer emergency calls without relevant justification should also be 
actionable as “bad faith.”161   
 
It is a further question whether the plaintiff’s recovery should be limited to 
detrimental reliance loss, or extended to the full loss of the benefit. By analogy to the 
exceptional professional duties of affirmative action one could argue it is a standing 
promise to provide to provide the benefit, open to being accepted to create a 
“contract without consideration” unless and until it is withdrawn. As noted in 
Michael: 
 
Every person who enters into a learned profession undertakes to bring to 
the exercise of it a reasonable degree of care and skill. He does not 
undertake, if he is an attorney, that at all events you shall gain your case, 
nor does a surgeon undertake that he will perform a cure, nor does he 
undertake to use the highest possible degree of care and skill.162 
                                                 
160 Cooper, supra note 16 is the leading example. There is an expansive summary of the law on point in 
Taylor v Canada, supra note 22 at paras 75–91. The exceptions are the unique public duty cases identified 
supra note 17.   
 
161 See Anns, supra note 12 at 102. 
 
162 Michael, supra note 1 at para 178 quoting Tindal CJ in Lanphier v Phipos (1838) 8 C & P 475, 479. 
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This principle has been extended to lawyers, doctors, other health care providers163 
and ambulance service providers.164 It has not been extended to police or firefighters, 
but it could be.  As noted above, with recognized rescue professionals such as the 
police there should be no difficulty in determining what a reasonable police officer 
ought to have done.165  
 
The Tofaris and Steel proposal covers more ground than assumption of 
responsibility where the plaintiff is unaware of the special danger, but the police 
department is. The alleged negligence would be the failure to warn the plaintiff, or to 
control the potential assailant. General Canadian common law recognizes numerous 
exceptions to the “no duty” rule based on special relationships of control.166 I suspect 
a good personal injury lawyer, especially one working in a “no unique public duty” 
jurisdiction, would be happy to bring a case against the police seeking to expand this 
line of authority beyond a duty to control a person already in custody.167    
 
Tofaris and Steel’s proposal is specific to the police, and they emphasize 
that the “special status” of the police is what justifies their proposed unique police 
duty.168 My preferred approach is to work with basic common law negligence and to 
allow the flexibility of the common law to take into account special facts relevant to 
the status of the public defendant when applying the general principles. I believe that 
what drives Tofaris and Steel to the preference for a unique public duty is the need to 
circumvent a narrow definition of assumption of responsibility specific to the police 
in the UK.169 There are no police-specific definitions of assumption of responsibility 
in Canada. This makes our ordinary common law more adaptable to the special 
arguments in favour of police liability in the types of circumstances envisaged by 
Tofaras and Steel. Neither Tofaris and Steel’s proposal nor basic private party 
                                                 
163 Michael, supra note 1 at para 112. 
 
164 Ibid at para 81. 
 
165 See 190–191, above.  
 
166 See 175, above. A case like Jane Doe, supra note 43, absent the Charter element, might also be 
explained along these lines.  
 
167 This is discussed in McBride & Bagshaw, supra note 33 at 245 where the authors also refer to John 
Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky “Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate 
Embrace of Negligent Enabling” (2009) 44 Wake Forest L Rev 1211 at 1240, n 121 in support of an 
expanded notion of control beyond custody. Chamberlain, “Serve and Protect”, supra note 143 cites 
several lower court decisions that take a very expansive view along these lines. We should also keep in 
mind that there has long existed in common law support for a “Bad Samaritan” liability rule that would 
impose liability for the failure to perform an easy rescue from a situation threatening life or serious bodily 
harm to another. Such provisions do exist in many civil law jurisdictions. See, e.g. Allen Linden, “Toward 
Tort Liability for Bad Samaritans” (2016) 53 Alta L Rev 837. 
 
168 Tofaris & Steel, “Omissions”, supra note 36 at 129. 
 
169 Ibid at 150. Tofaris and Steel also discuss their preference for unique duty over assumption of 
responsibility at Tofaris & Steel, “Police Liability”, supra note 36 at 23–4 based on the debate about 
whether a responsibility is truly assumed or imposed by law in the UK.   
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Canadian negligence law explain or justify the decisions in the classic unique public 
duty cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.170 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Unique public duties pose more problems than they solve. They allow the courts on 
their own initiative to shift classic governance functions to the courts. They damage 
the structure of the common law. Most importantly, where they appear to be most 
needed, in Michael for example, they are unnecessary. Private party negligence can 
address the issues, and do so in a way that takes into account the unique aspects of 
the government’s role in perpetrating the alleged wrong. There are also other 
options. Perhaps a better answer lies in public law?171 If unique responses to police 
failure to address domestic violence are necessary, the legislature should provide 
them. There is no constitutional objection to the legislature creating a statutory cause 
of action to deal with a duty to prevent crime generally, or a duty to prevent domestic 
violence particularly. The complaint under the Human Rights Act, 1998 for breach of 
the defendants' duties as public authorities to protect Ms. Michael's right to life under 
article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights was allowed to proceed.172 A 
Canadian plaintiff might succeed in an action for damages under the Charter.173 The 
police misconduct in Michael was the subject of a damning public inquiry, discipline 
and in one case dismissal.174 We should resist the temptation to resolve Ms. 
Michael’s case with a unique public duty. Hard cases make bad law.  
 
I do not purport to have offered the definitive word on unique duties of care. 
Nor do I believe that Canadian judges have yet developed principled guidelines for 
creating unique duties of care. A full and open discussion would be welcome.    
                                                 
170 Supra note 17. 
 
171 Nolan, supra note 25 at 291 quoting Beever, “Rediscovering”, supra note 66 at 340. See also Paradis 
Honey v Canada, 2015 FCA 89 at paras 119–146, 382 DLR (4th) 720. 
 
172 The implications of this are considered in McBride, “Michael Comment”, supra note 4. 
 
173 See e.g. Jane Doe, supra note 43 and Dudley v British Columbia, 2013 BCSC 1005, 49 BCLR (5th) 
382 [Dudley].  This may be a better way to attack systemic wrongdoing.  
 
174 This was not the case in Dudley, ibid, nor in Mooney, supra note 9. See Chamberlain, “Optimism”, 
supra note 9 at para 33. Police accountability is one of the reasons Tofaris & Steel, “Omissions”, supra 
note 36 offer in support of a unique police duty of care. It is possible to do this otherwise. 
